Everettian quantum mechanics and the problem of ontological extravagance

Abstract

Since it neither relies on a collapse postulate nor posits a hidden variable, Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) is an attractive option among realist interpretations of quantum mechanics. In some sense, EQM is a simpler theory than its competitors. However, it also appears to require more structure; unlike its competitor theories, EQM has traditionally been taken to entail a multitude of worlds, as every possible outcome of every quantum process is actualized in at least one world. Since no other realist competitor theory shares this feature, the most prominent objection raised against EQM is that of ontological extravagance. Everettians have given this objection little serious attention, at least in part because the objection from ontological extravagance has not yet been carefully articulated in the literature. To clarify this objection, I distinguish between two types of simplicity criteria: ones concerned with ontological abundance and others concerned with postulate abundance. Where ontological abundance criteria concern the number of concrete objects that some theory posits, postulate abundance norms instead concern the number and overall complexity of the set of postulates of the theory. Unfortunately, it is unclear how we ought to weigh these simplicity-related metaphysical considerations, and worse, as I argue, there is no independent motivation for either sort. I argue that we ought to instead consider the proximity between the way the theory says the world is, and the way the world appears to be. With the deadlock between Everettians and non-Everettians on what sort of simplicity criterion reigns supreme, this severely overlooked criterion offers a promising route forward in the dialectic. This alternate criterion roughly corresponds to what Emery (2023) calls the minimal divergence norm, under which we ought to prefer theories that deviate least from the manifest image, or the way the world generally appears to be. However, such a norm requires further specification; there is no image of the world that uniquely picks out the manifest image. Observations themselves depend on our theoretical commitments, which vary from agent to agent, and so there are many manifest images. To avoid this multiplicity, I argue that we ought to look to the physical sciences for a widely-accepted theory that describes the world as we experience it. Classical mechanics (CM), the predecessor theory to quantum mechanics, does exactly that; though it is certainly not a correct description of reality, it is sufficiently accurate for numerous forms of engineering, as it describes macroscopic reality well enough. I argue that we ought to treat the way that classical mechanics says the world is as the manifest image. Then, the third type of criteria, which I call classical divergence, concerns the degree to which the way some theory in question says the world is deviates from the way that CM says the world is. I defend this norm on pragmatic grounds, arguing that adhering to it offers a distinct epistemic advantage. While EQM does not necessarily tell us that our world is vastly different from the way that CM says it is, it is generally taken to entail many more worlds than its competitor theories. With this new set of simplicity criteria in place, Everettians can better understand the available dimensions along which they may endeavor to improve their ontology. This new norm that I advocate offers hope: Everettians can seek a less extravagant ontology by strategically minimizing classical divergence.